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MAKING CHOCOLATE SWEETER: HOW TO 
ENCOURAGE HERSHEY COMPANY TO 
CLEAN UP ITS SUPPLY CHAIN AND 
ELIMINATE CHILD LABOR 
KATHRYN MANZA* 
Abstract: Child labor is a complex issue that deeply permeates cocoa production 
in West Africa. Multinational corporations, such as Hershey Company, are often 
in the best position to address child labor because these human rights violations 
occur within their own supply chains. The U.S. legislature can encourage multi-
national corporations to address child labor through mandatory public disclosure 
and due diligence. This mandatory disclosure may encourage multinational cor-
porations to use fair trade certification or sponsorship programs—solutions that 
keep children away from hazardous occupations while still addressing the root 
cause of child labor, poverty. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 31, 2012, American children filled Halloween bags with Her-
shey’s Chocolate Kisses, Kit Kat Bars, and Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups.1 All of 
these Halloween staples originated from Hershey Company’s (Hershey) ex-
pansive portfolio.2 Hershey is the leading chocolate manufacturer in North 
America, controlling 42 percent of the market for chocolate products in the 
United States and generating over $6 billion in annual revenues.3 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
 * Kathryn Manza is the Executive Note Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
 1See Jennifer Booton, Hershey Stirs Up Stronger 3Q Profit, Says Halloween Off to Good Start, 
FOX BUSINESS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/10/25/hershey-stirs-up-
stronger-3q-profit-says-halloween-off-to-good-start/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Joseph Harry, Go 
Trick-Or-Treating with Hershey’s for Short-Term Gains, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 5, 2012), http://seek
ingalpha.com/article/906381-go-trick-or-treating-with-hershey-s-for-short-term-gains (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014). 
 2 See Harry, supra note 1. 
 3 Eleanor Bloxham, Chocolate and Child Labor: A Hurdle for Hershey, FORTUNE (Nov. 16, 
2012), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/11/16/hershey-child-labor-suit/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2014); Iulia Filip, Hershey Co. Sued for Info on Child Labor, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 5, 
2012), http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/11/05/51961.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
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Hershey is an American icon, frequently considered one of the country’s favor-
ite brands of chocolate.4 
As American children enjoyed their Halloween treats, however, most did 
not know that the chocolate dissolving on their tongues was partially produced 
by other children laboring under difficult conditions in West Africa.5 The day 
after Halloween 2012, the Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement 
System, which owns 1,800 shares in Hershey, filed a complaint against the 
corporation in Delaware’s Chancery Court.6 The shareholders sought to en-
force their rights to inspect Hershey’s corporate books7 in order to investigate 
whether Hershey’s Board of Directors permitted the company to integrate ille-
gal child labor into its business model.8 The shareholders argued that the 
Board’s actions could damage Hershey’s brand and reputation, and further-
more would breach the Board’s fiduciary duties to Hershey and its sharehold-
ers.9 The shareholders also argued that an inspection of Hershey’s books and 
records would help them decide whether to file a subsequent derivative suit on 
behalf of the company.10 
This complaint arose more than a decade after the company signed a pro-
tocol pledging to terminate any use of slave and child labor by 2005.11 This 
lawsuit suggests that the voluntary agreement was insufficient to prevent a 
brand children love from exploiting children across the Atlantic Ocean.12 Her-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Shivani Ganguly, Hershey: What Happened to Putting a Smile on Children’s Faces? SUS-
TAINABLE BRANDS (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/articles/
hershey-what-happened-putting-smile-childrens-faces (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Charles B. Stock-
dale, America’s Favorite Chocolate Brands, FOX BUSINESS (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.
com/industries/2012/04/06/americas-favorite-chocolate-brands/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 5 See Bloxham, supra note 3; Filip, supra note 3. 
 6 Angela Ramos, Shareholder Suit of Hershey Co Alleging Child Labor/Trafficking in Supply 
Chain, EXAMINER (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/shareholder-suit-of-hershey-co-
alleging-child-labor-trafficking-supply-chain (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Filip, supra note 3. 
 7 See Ramos, supra note 6; Filip, supra note 3; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2010). 
Section 220 of Delaware General Corporate Law provides limited rights to shareholders to inspect a 
corporation’s “books and records.” Id. § 220(b). Section 220(c) gives shareholders permission to ap-
ply to the Court of Chancery for an order to compel an inspection if the corporation does not allow the 
shareholder to inspect the requested records or reply to the demand within five business days. Id. 
§ 220(c). 
 8 Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220 To Compel Inspection of Books and Records 
¶ 1, La. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. 7996 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 9 Id. ¶ 2. 
 10 Id. ¶ 8. 
 11 Id. ¶ 2; CHOCOLATE MFG. ASS’N, PROTOCOL FOR THE GROWING AND PROCESSING OF COCOA 
BEANS AND THEIR DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS IN A MANNER THAT COMPLIES WITH ILO CONVENTION 
182 CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION AND IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST 
FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 3 (2001), available at http://www.cocoainitiative.org/images/stories/pdf/
harkin%20engel%20protocol.pdf [hereinafter Protocol]. 
 12 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 1; Protocol, supra note 11, at 1; Ramos, supra note 6. 
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shey’s struggle to meet these expectations also provides a vehicle to explore 
even larger questions: how well can companies regulate themselves through 
the motivations of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the market-
place?13 Should legislatures impose hard law measures rather than soft law 
targets?14 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a background on CSR in 
the United States today and charts Hershey’s work over the past decade to re-
duce the use of child labor in its cocoa production. Part II tracks legislators’ 
escalating use of due diligence to obtain public policy objectives and provides 
an overview of international law on child labor. Part III recommends that mul-
tinational firms stay proactive about child labor in order to avoid harm to their 
brand and corporate reputation. Additionally, legislators should encourage 
companies to do so by mandating supply chain due diligence and offering tax 
breaks, among other incentives, to companies that become fair trade-certified. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Elusive Concept of CSR 
“Corporate social responsibility,” one writer for Forbes’ CSR blog bluntly 
wrote, “is not going to solve the world’s problems.”15 In his book charting Le-
vi Strauss & Company’s (Levi’s) attempts to incorporate ethics into a multina-
tional business operation, Karl Schoenberger seemed inclined to agree.16 He 
wrote: 
Corporations are incapable, almost by design, of exercising moral 
and ethical judgments . . . They react when coerced into accountabil-
ity by some external force—a legal constraint or the scandal of a 
negative advocacy campaign. Even for companies with the most no-
ble of intentions, the unwritten laws of the free market do not pro-
vide a mechanism to reconcile the true cost of social responsibility 
with the fundamental need to be profitable. In other words . . . an 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, at ix (2000); Christopher Whelan & Neta Ziv, Law Firm Ethics in the 
Shadow of Corporate Social Responsibility, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 153, 155(2013). 
 14 See James M. Roberts & Andrew W. Markley, Why the U.S. Should Oppose International Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR) Mandates, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 4, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2012/05/why-the-us-should-oppose-international-corporate-social-responsibility-csr-
mandates#_ftnref32 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (arguing that the United States should not pursue manda-
tory CSR policies for American companies). 
 15 James Epstein-Reeves, Six Reasons Companies Should Embrace CSR, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/02/21/six-reasons-companies-should-embrace-csr (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014). 
 16 See SCHOENBERGER, supra note 13, at ix. 
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organization’s instinct to succeed prevails over any lofty principles 
it might espouse.17 
Despite the obvious limitations of CSR, over the last twenty years con-
sumers and managers alike have rapidly developed the notion that companies 
should give back to the communities, employees, and the environments with 
which they do business.18 Many current CSR programs are considered tools to 
improve a firm’s reputation and brand recognition, but critics remain con-
cerned that anything beyond this could be an improper use of shareholders’ 
money.19 This can lead to paradoxical efforts as corporations launch well-
publicized charity initiatives while still contributing to human rights violations 
through their own business operations.20 
Nevertheless, an evolving view of CSR—one seemingly espoused by the 
Hershey shareholders in their complaint—compels companies to improve the 
well being of individuals in their own supply chains.21 This view promotes the 
concept that a company should be held accountable not just to shareholders but 
also to other actors in a corporate enterprise, such as employees, suppliers, and 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Id. 
 18 Peter Gjørtler, Recent European Union Initiatives & the Danish Experience, 21 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 435, 435 (2011); Morten T. Hansen et al., Can Companies Both Do Well and Do 
Good? CEO.COM (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.ceo.com/flink/?lnk=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.hbr.
org%2Fcs%2F2013%2F01%2Fcan_companies_both_do_well_and.html&id=295589 (last visited Mar. 
14, 2014); see also Whelan & Ziv, supra note 13, at 942 (detailing how consumers help keep corpora-
tions accountable by expressing purchasing preferences through their wallets, boycotts, and public 
information campaigns). 
 19 See Roberts, supra note 14; Alaa Rady, Is Corporate Social Responsibility Stealing Money 
from Shareholders? FAST CO. (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/1725752/corporate-
social-responsibility-stealing-money-shareholders (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 20 See RAISE THE BAR HERSHEY, STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR: THE REAL CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT FOR THE HERSHEY COMPANY 9 (2011), available at http://www.raisethebar
hershey.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HersheyReport2011.pdf [hereinafter STILL TIME TO RAISE 
THE BAR] (explaining how Hershey donates to various children’s charities in the United States and 
West Africa as part of its social responsibility program, while neglecting to enforce policies that elim-
inate forced and child labor from its supply chain). 
 21 See Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 1; Paul Klein, Moving Beyond CSR: The Business of 
Social Change, FORBES BLOG (Nov. 12, 2012,), http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/11/12/moving-
beyond-csr-the-business-of-social-change/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). Klein’s article explains the 
important role that supply chains play in a corporation’s social responsibility and how views towards 
these supply chains are evolving: 
Improving supply chain operations has the potential to reduce costs and risk and make a 
meaningful social and environmental difference. Increasingly, supply chain managers 
are accountable for delivering more than economy and efficiency to the sourcing of 
products and to the logistics of delivery. They are also responsible for ensuring that 
suppliers have fair hiring policies and safe working conditions and that environmental 
impacts are reduced wherever possible. 
Klein, supra. 
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people living in the communities where firms conduct their business.22 These 
so-called “stakeholders” in the company are seen as having a “moral stake,” 
rather than an “equity stake,” in the company.23 
To improve the well being of stakeholders in their supply chains, a com-
pany’s vision of CSR must also extend to that company’s suppliers.24 Many 
companies today have codes of conduct, in which corporations ensure that 
their suppliers uphold the same standards of social responsibility to which cor-
porations themselves adhere.25 As companies began to outsource more jobs to 
a global network of contractors and suppliers, they become increasingly sus-
ceptible to litigation for human rights violations, which could wreak havoc on 
a brand’s reputation.26 Therefore, requirements formerly under the purview of 
public governance—such as environmental standards and workers’ rights—are 
being replaced with private contracting.27 
The theory that companies should concern themselves with “stakeholders” 
in their own supply chains does not rest on altruistic goals alone.28 Current 
scholarship has also begun to suggest that companies can be profitable and com-
pete effectively in the long term by prioritizing stakeholders’ interests when con-
structing and implementing business plans.29 In fact, many top-performing com-
panies have built social purposes into their operations.30 In a well-received arti-
cle in the Harvard Business Journal, Rosabeth Moss Kanter stressed that “great 
                                                                                                                           
 22 SCHOENBERGER, supra note 13, at 23; Hansen, supra note 18; Sarah Jane Leake, Shareholders 
v. Stakeholders: Managing Interests and Expectations on the Company Board, BLOOMBERG LAW, 
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/shareholders-v-stakeholders/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 23 SCHOENBERGER, supra note 13, at 23. 
 24 See Whelan, supra note 13, at 2–4. 
 25 Id. at 3–4. 
 26 See SCHOENBERGER, supra note 13, at 56–58. For example, in 1999 two lawsuits filed in Cali-
fornia against Gap Inc., Nordstrom Inc., Tommy Hilfiger USA, Oshkosh B’Gosh, and Wal-Mart ar-
gued that the companies should be held jointly liable for the human rights transgressions of their sew-
ing factory contractors in Saipan. Id. at 67. The companies were exposed to negative publicity and 
forced to pay heavy fines to compensate the workers. Id. at 68–69. 
 27 Whelan, supra note 13, at 4. 
 28 See SCHOENBERGER, supra note 13, at 24; Rosabeth Moss Kanter, How Great Companies 
Think Differently, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 66, 68 (arguing that a firm that takes a long term 
approach by investing in its employees and community can still be profit maximizing as a firm only 
concerned with making a profit). 
 29 See SCHOENBERGER, supra note 13, at 24; Kanter, supra note 28, at 71 (illustrating how before 
a merger, Shinhan Bank negotiated with Chohung Bank’s union, gave equal representation to both 
banks’ managers on a management committee, increased employees’ salaries, held a series of retreats 
to foster social bonding in order to integrate the two cultures, which lead to a successful merger where 
Shinhan outperformed the South Korean stock market). 
 30 John Mackey & Raj Sisodia, “Conscious Capitalism” Is Not an Oxymoron, HARV. BUS. REV. 
BLOG NETWORK, (Jan. 14, 2013) http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/01/cultivating_a_higher_conscious.html 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (explaining how conscious companies like the Container Store, Starbucks, 
Trader Joe’s, Patagonia, and Whole Foods Market attempt to follow a more conscious model of capi-
talism rather than simply trying to make a profit). 
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companies” make profits while also investing in employees and communities—
in short, investing in the company’s far-reaching future.31 
Restructuring supply chains to demonstrate a company’s commitment to 
its stakeholders, however, is not an easy task.32 Policymakers note that interna-
tional labor issues are extremely complicated and are the result of multiple cul-
tural and economic factors.33 International organizations recognize that child 
labor is an especially difficult issue because corporations do not want to de-
prive impoverished families of extra income,34 but also recognize that children 
deserve an education free from debilitating work.35 Corporations cannot fix 
these complicated social issues alone, but rather need to work in combination 
with local governments, NGOs, and other actors.36 
B. Hershey Company and CSR 
Milton Hershey, the celebrated founder of Hershey, demonstrated his 
commitment to children throughout his illustrious career.37 In 1909, fifteen 
years after he started his chocolate factory, the entrepreneur founded the Her-
shey Industrial School for Orphans and put his personal fortune of $60 million 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Kanter, supra note 28, at 68. 
 32 See Klein, supra note 21. 
 33 See TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32990, CHILD LABOR IN 
WEST AFRICAN COCOA PRODUCTION: ISSUES AND U.S. POLICY 11 (2005); INT’L LABOR ORG., THE 
END OF CHILD LABOR: WITHIN REACH 65 (2006). The CSR Report for Congress elaborated on the 
reasons for child labor and trafficking in West Africa: 
The extent to which West African cocoa producers employ child labor is, in part, a 
function of economic factors. The extent of child trafficking is likewise affected by 
such factors, these include low cocoa prices, low incomes of family farmers, and large 
numbers of small holder farmers who cannot afford to engage hired labor . . . Cultural 
factors are involved too. Sociologists point out that not only is there a tradition of chil-
dren participating in household and farm work from an early age (the IITA study), but 
there is a strong tradition in West Africa of child migration both within countries and 
across borders. Such migratory patterns make it difficult to monitor and control child 
trafficking. A study of Malian children points out that children are often sent to live 
outside the family, village or country for work, family solidarity, or education and con-
cludes that migration is a rite of passage, and a financial necessity for many. 
TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., supra, at 11. 
 34 See Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 21. Although this is often a delicate factor in the issue 
of child labor, it is not an issue in West Africa. See id. Most children working on cocoa farms in West 
Africa do not receive compensation for their labor, but rather are forced into work or assist with their 
families’ farms. Id. 
 35 Anna A. Kornikova, Note, International Child Labor Regulation 101: What Corporations Need 
to Know About Treaties Pertaining to Working Youth, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 207, 222 (2008); Klein, 
supra note 21. 
 36 See Klein, supra note 21. 
 37 See Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 3. 
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in a trust for the school when he passed away.38 Today, the Milton Hershey 
School provides almost 2,000 underprivileged children in Hershey, Pennsylva-
nia with “free housing, education, and medical care.”39 Hershey Trust Compa-
ny, which currently administers the school, is Hershey Company’s largest 
shareholder.40 Therefore, as the recent complaint by the Louisiana Municipal 
Police Employees’ Retirement System points out, the school for underprivi-
leged children in the United States may be partially funded by the labor of un-
derprivileged children in West Africa.41 
Hershey’s 2011 CSR report stated “the well-being of children, especially 
those at risk [is] at the heart of [the company’s] community efforts.”42 In addi-
tion to the Milton Hershey School in Pennsylvania, Hershey is involved with 
other international efforts to improve the lives of children, including funding a 
program to prevent young children from contracting malaria in the Ivory 
Coast, providing donations for North American children’s hospitals, and fund-
ing a Filipino orphanage that caters to children with special needs.43 In fact, 
Forbes ranked Hershey at the top of the list for brands with “ethical leader-
ship” in 2011.44 
Hershey’s commitment to children through charity work, however, is jux-
taposed with labor practices in its own supply chain in Africa.45 West African 
countries, such as Ghana and the Ivory Coast, provide 70 percent of the 
world’s cocoa supply.46 Indeed, Hershey’s 2011 CSR report identifies Ghana 
and the Ivory Coast as countries from which the company sources key ingredi-
ents, although the identity of its almost 10,000 cocoa suppliers remains undis-
closed.47 In 2011, nearly two million children, including “an estimated 819,921 
in the Ivory Coast and 997,357 in Ghana,” worked illegally on cocoa farms.48 
Only 5 to 10 percent of these children work for pay, while the rest are forced to 
work or assist with their families’ farms.49 These children are exposed to pesti-
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. ¶¶ 3, 11. 
 39 Id. ¶ 11. 
 40 Id. ¶ 12. 
 41 Id. 
 42 HERSHEY CO., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRESS REPORT 2011, at 44 (2011), 
available at http://www.thehersheycompany.com/assets/pdfs/hersheycompany/Hershey2011CSRReport.
pdf. 
 43 Id. at 54. 
 44 Jennifer Rooney, Forbes Top Brands: ‘Ethical Leadership,’ FORBES (Oct. 5, 2011), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferrooney/2011/10/05/top-brands-ethical-leadership/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014). 
 45 See Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 46 Id. ¶ 15. 
 47 HERSHEY CO., supra note 42, at 8; see Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 25. 
 48 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 21. 
 49 Id. 
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cides, wield dangerous equipment such as machetes, and move heavy loads, 
while at the same time enduring abuse and malnutrition.50 In Ghana, almost 32 
percent of rural children have endured injuries or illness while working.51 
Starting in 2001, the media began to uncover the overwhelming use of il-
licit labor practices in West African cocoa farms.52 This development provoked 
the U.S. Congress to propose an amendment to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, which would require la-
bels on cocoa products that signified whether the supply chain was “slave-
free.”53 The House passed Amendment 142, which provided the FDA with 
$250,000 in order to develop a label for chocolate products guaranteeing that 
child labor was not used in the growing and harvesting of cocoa.54 
The cocoa industry lobbied heavily against the proposed amendment.55 
Consequently, after the House passed the bill, the Senate companion bill never 
even made it to the Senate floor.56 Instead, chocolate companies, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO),57 and members of Congress proposed elimi-
nating these human rights violations without the interference of legislation.58 
On September 19, 2001, chocolate companies, including Hershey, signed the 
Harkin-Engel Protocol (Protocol).59 The Protocol was “voluntary and non-
legislative.”60 Signatories to the Protocol agreed to develop their own certifica-
tion process that would ensure that the “worst forms of child labor,” as defined 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Shima Baradaran & Stephanie Barclay, Fair Trade and Child Labor, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2011). 
 51 Id. at 56. 
 52 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 5. 
 53 Id. ¶ 15; TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 1. 
 54 TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 13. 
 55 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 16. 
 56 TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 1. 
 57 Kornikova, supra note 35, at 217–18. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is an interna-
tional body “that develops labor standards through adoption of conventions and recommendations and 
engages governments, employers, and workers in the standard-setting process in a model known as 
the tripartite structure.” Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 16. 
 60 TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 6. 
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by the ILO,61 were not used in cocoa production.62 The self-imposed deadline 
for this public certification process was July 1, 2005.63 
Despite Hershey’s secrecy about its suppliers’ practices, a precursory 
glance at the company’s Supplier Code of Conduct appears to demonstrate 
Hershey’s commitment to the Protocol.64 The Code of Conduct illustrates the 
company’s expectations that suppliers will “support and participate in industry 
efforts aimed at the elimination of the ‘worst forms of child labor’ wherever 
they exist in the supply chain.”65 The Code also mandates that “suppliers must 
not utilize or benefit in any way from forced or compulsory labor.”66 
The Complaint argues, however, that the Code is not as aggressive as it 
originally appears.67 In order to do business with Hershey, potential suppliers 
only need to acknowledge the Code and state its “intention to comply with its 
requirements.”68 The Code does not even clarify whether it applies to raw ma-
terials like cocoa from West Africa.69 Furthermore, Hershey has not released 
any information illustrating how the company administers the Code—casting 
doubt on whether the company enforces the Code and whether suppliers actu-
ally follow its provisions.70 
Over a decade after Hershey signed the Protocol and Congress did not 
impose any hard law measures, little work has been accomplished to fulfill the 
Protocol’s objectives to reduce the “worst forms of child labor” in West Afri-
ca.71 In 2006, a year after Hershey should have already fulfilled the obligations 
of the Protocol, shareholders submitted a proposal to Hershey’s Board of Di-
rectors expressing concern about the use of child labor in West Africa and re-
                                                                                                                           
 61 ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimina-
tion of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-5 (1999), art. 3, avail-
able at www.ilo.org/public/English/standards/relm/ilc87/com-chic.htm [hereinafter ILO Convention]. 
“The worst forms of child labor” is defined in ILO Convention 182. Id. It encompasses “all forms of 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and 
serfdom and forced or compulsory labour” and “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in 
which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children.” Id. arts. 3(a), 3(d). 
 62 Protocol, supra note 11, at 3. 
 63 Id. at 3. 
 64 See Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 25; Protocol, supra note 11, at 1; HERSHEY CO., SUP-
PLIER CODE OF CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS 1 (2010), available at http://www.thehersheycompany.
com/assets/pdfs/hersheycompany/Hershey_CA-Disclosure.pdf. 
 65 HERSHEY CO., supra note 64, at 1. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 64. 
 68 HERSHEY CO., supra note 64, at 3. 
 69 STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR, supra note 20, at 12. 
 70 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 65; STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR, supra note 20, at 12. 
 71 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 18; TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 1. 
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questing that management report on Hershey’s cocoa suppliers.72 The board 
refused.73 
In October 2012, Hershey released a statement that all of its cocoa would 
come from suppliers that meet international labor standards by 2020.74 This 
fifteen-year extension from the deadline to which Hershey committed in the 
Protocol compelled Whole Foods to pull Scharffen Berger, a Hershey luxury 
brand, from its shelves until the company provided information on its CSR.75 
Thus, Hershey’s perceived failure to hold its own supply chain accountable has 
already begun to damage the beloved brand’s reputation.76 Hershey’s delay in 
implementing the Protocol, as well as the secrecy surrounding its suppliers, has 
provided both the company’s shareholders and stakeholders little confidence 
that 2020 will be different from 2005.77 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. How Multinational Firms and the U.S. Government Currently  
Integrate the United Nation’s Guiding Principles 
Regardless of how the current litigation against Hershey develops, critics 
have argued that more needs to be done to stem the use of child labor in the 
cocoa industry.78 Hershey itself conceded that the company would need until 
2020 to become child labor free.79 Since the chocolate companies signed the 
Protocol, they have made nearly $1 trillion.80 These companies, however, have 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 26, Protocol, supra note 11, at 3. 
 73 Verified Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 26. 
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used only 0.0075 percent of those profits to improve children’s working condi-
tions in West Africa.81 
Multinational companies are often considered the primary beneficiaries of 
cheap labor practices.82 Critics often express concern that corporations will 
take advantage of lenient labor regulations in other countries in order to reduce 
costs.83 Addressing the relationship between corporations and their human 
rights practices, the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights, Transna-
tional Corporations, and Other Business Enterprises issued a report on March 
21, 2011 to the U.N. Human Rights Council entitled “Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights” (Guiding Principles).84 The Guiding Principles 
rest on three pillars: for the state to protect against human rights abuses, for 
businesses to respect human rights, and for victims of human rights abuses to 
have greater access to effective remedies for their abuses.85 
Some corporations have voluntarily implemented programs that fall in 
line with the Guiding Principles.86 Levi Straus & Company set up an innova-
tive sponsorship program that sent factory children to school while continuing 
to pay wages and benefits to their families until the children reached a legal 
age to work.87 Companies have also complied with the spirit of the Guiding 
Principles by certifying their products through fair trade organizations.88 Cur-
rently, the Fairtrade Labeling Organization International is the “only fair trade 
certification body working in the West African cocoa industry.”89 In order to 
receive free trade certification, cocoa farmers must refrain from any type of 
forced or child labor, protect workers from discrimination, and safeguard their 
ability to freely associate and collectively bargain.90 Farmers who reach these 
standards are guaranteed a fair trade price floor for their produce and a social 
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premium to fund community development products.91 In order to receive the 
fair trade label, 100 percent of the produce must be certified.92 
To offset some of the certification costs, the European Union provides 
“subsidies and tax benefits to companies that participate in fair trade.”93 The 
European Union is also committed to developing consumer awareness about 
fair trade by supporting studies on the impact of fair trade and encouraging 
funding for sustainability schemes that utilize fair trade.94 In 2007 and 2008, 
for example, the European Union spent €19 million on education about fair 
trade.95 
The Guiding Principles also recommend that states clearly express the 
expectation that any business domiciled in their jurisdiction will respect human 
rights along their supply chain—including operations in foreign countries.96 
The United States, where Hershey is incorporated, receives about 20 percent of 
total cocoa exports directly from the Ivory Coast.97 Other countries that import 
cocoa from the Ivory Coast and Ghana, such as Canada and European coun-
tries, also supply U.S. companies with products processed from cocoa beans.98 
The United States has attempted to use multiple strategies to combat in-
ternational labor problems by applying pressure to companies that do business 
in the United States.99 For example, the Sanders Amendment of 1997 to the 
Tariff Act of 1930 prohibited the importation of goods created by forced la-
bor.100 The Tariff Act was amended again in 2000 to specifically include goods 
created by forced or indentured child labor.101 Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa 
also introduced the Child Labor Deterrence Act in 1992.102 This act would 
have banned any goods produced using child labor and would have imposed 
harsh penalties on any violating companies.103 Senator Harkin introduced the 
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bill again in 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999, but it failed to pass on all occa-
sions.104 
In the past few years, however, legislators have shown an increased will-
ingness to compel corporations to perform the proper due diligence needed to 
understand the extent of human rights violations in their supply chains.105 
Through such disclosures, policy makers hope that public pressure will compel 
multinational corporations to eradicate labor problems.106 To date, enacted leg-
islation surrounding corporate due diligence and human rights has not targeted 
child labor.107 Even so, since legislators have demonstrated an increasing will-
ingness to use disclosure as an incentive to clean up supply chains, due dili-
gence may be used in the future as a way to confront child labor as well.108 
The first time legislators utilized due diligence to shed light on public 
companies’ supply chains occurred when President Obama signed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law on July 21, 
2010.109 Although most of the legislation intended to reform financial services 
regulations, a few provisions utilized public company reporting systems in an 
unprecedented way for public policy purposes.110 For example, Section 1502 
of the Dodd-Frank Act requires publicly traded companies to annually disclose 
whether they use any conflict minerals111 from the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo (DRC) in their production.112 Armed groups used the sale of conflict 
minerals to purchase weapons and perpetuate hostilities, including extreme 
levels of sexual violence.113 If a company used conflict minerals from the 
DRC, Section 1502 requires a report describing any due diligence efforts im-
plemented to investigate the minerals’ chain of custody, which in turn could 
increase consumer awareness about the use of conflict minerals and thus per-
haps discourage firms from continuing to purchase minerals from sources that 
benefit these armed groups.114 
The Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit companies from using conflict 
minerals.115 Rather, it relies on the public nature of the reports to compel com-
panies to clean up their supply chains and thus protect their reputation.116 In 
fact, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) make the disclosures available online, thus allowing consumers to 
easily view the company’s business practices and supply chain.117 
The same year that President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act, Califor-
nia Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the California Transparency 
Supply Chain Act (CTSPA).118 The CTSPA requires specified companies that 
do business in California to disclose their procedures to audit their suppliers 
and any efforts they have taken to eradicate slavery and human trafficking.119 
The CTSPA went into effect January 1, 2012.120 Like the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
CTSPA requires public disclosure.121 Disclosures must be posted on the retail 
seller’s or manufacturer’s website with a prominent link to the requested in-
formation.122 
Manufacturers first must disclose how they evaluate supply chains to find 
and eradicate human trafficking or forced labor.123 If a third party did not make 
the verification, this also must be disclosed.124 Second, manufacturers must 
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disclose to what extent they conduct audits of suppliers in order to evaluate 
whether suppliers comply with the company’s labor standards.125 Third, manu-
facturers have to disclose whether they require suppliers to ensure that any ma-
terials used in the finalized products do not infringe on the exporting country’s 
laws surrounding forced labor or human trafficking.126 Fourth, they must dis-
close whether employees or contractors who fail to meet company standards 
on slavery and trafficking are held accountable within the company.127 Finally, 
manufacturers must disclose how much training the company provides to em-
ployees and managers who administer the firm’s supply chain on issues related 
to human trafficking and slavery.128 
Like the Dodd-Frank Act, the CTSPA does not actually require that af-
fected companies follow these five steps.129 Rather, the CTSPA relies on the 
risk that not implementing any changes at all could ultimately cost the compa-
ny more than following these five steps due to the damage to a brand’s public 
image.130 Through this public pressure, companies may be compelled to look 
at their own supply chains, follow the CTSPA’s five steps, and combat slavery 
and human trafficking.131 Thus, the CTSPA intends to apply public pressure on 
manufacturers by educating consumers and investors on companies’ practic-
es.132 Anti-trafficking organizations can use the information displayed to en-
courage greater private sector involvement in combatting trafficking and slav-
ery.133 The California Attorney General can only grant injunctive relief under 
the CTSPA.134 Observers are still unsure about how strictly the California At-
torney General will choose to enforce the CTSPA or what type of injunctive 
relief will be sought.135 
In 2011, the year after legislators enacted the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
CTSPA, Representative Carolyn Maloney introduced a bill, H.R. 2759, entitled 
the Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act.136 The proposed 
federal legislation would apply to companies with annual worldwide gross 
profits above $100 million, and unlike the CTSPA, which only applies to re-
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tailers and manufacturers, would apply to any publicly traded or private com-
pany currently required to submit annual reports to the SEC.137 The bill would 
amend Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and require publicly 
listed companies to disclose efforts to eradicate not just human trafficking and 
slavery like the CTSPA, but also forced labor and the worst forms of child la-
bor, as defined by the ILO.138 
B. International Law on Children’s Rights 
Although the Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act faces 
an uphill battle to get passed, the introduction of a bill utilizing due diligence 
demonstrates public policy leaders’ increased concern about human rights in 
supply chains.139 If this bill, or another bill concerning child labor in American 
companies’ supply chains, is passed, a review of two international conventions 
on children, the United Nation’s (U.N.) Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) and the ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (ILO Con-
vention), will shed insight on how international law has shaped the conversa-
tion surrounding children and child labor thus far.140 
The UNCRC, although not ratified by the United States, provides a useful 
framework for balancing the varying policy considerations behind combating 
child labor.141 The UNCRC requires that states recognize the child’s right to be 
free from exploitation,142 to survive,143 and to enjoy an adequate standard of 
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living.144 These rights under the UNCRC, however, often conflict.145 Economic 
endeavors that enable a child to survive could also expose the child to danger-
ous work conditions.146 Anticipating this issue, the U.N. also instituted the 
“best interests” principle, which mandates that the child’s best interests are “a 
primary consideration” when implementing any policy that involves chil-
dren.147 The “best interests” principle allows states to consider any unique so-
cial and cultural obstacles while implementing the UNCRC’s universally rec-
ognized principles.148 
The United States gave greater support to, and ratified, the ILO Conven-
tion.149 The ILO Convention strove to take “immediate and comprehensive 
action” in order to eliminate the “worst forms of child labor” for all children 
under the age of eighteen.150 Article 3 defines “the worst forms of child labor” 
as “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery,” including selling and 
trafficking children, debt bondage, and forced labor.151 It also encompasses 
“work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is 
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.”152 Additionally, the 
ILO Convention reaffirmed both the importance of education and the need to 
provide for children’s healthy integration into society while still addressing the 
poverty of their families.153 
Children working in the chocolate industry in West Africa begin at very 
young ages and wield machetes and apply pesticides without protective 
equipment.154 A study implemented in 2002 found that 64 percent of children 
on cocoa farms were under the age of fourteen, many of the children were reg-
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ularly beaten, and only 34 percent of children working on cocoa farms attend-
ed school.155 Additionally, between 30 percent and 50 percent of border guards 
and police officers in Burkina Faso and Mali reported child trafficking inci-
dents in 2009, with the Ivory Coast and Ghana mentioned as intended destina-
tions.156 Therefore, the work conditions in the cocoa industry fulfill both defi-
nitions of the worst forms of child labor and require “immediate and compre-
hensive action.”157 
III. ANALYSIS 
If the voluntary Protocol was not enough to compel Hershey to eliminate 
the worst forms of child labor in a timely manner, what else should be done?158 
So far, international law does not have the teeth to seriously combat child la-
bor, despite widespread support for the ILO Convention.159 The ILO lacks 
power because the organization relies on moral persuasion rather than hard 
sanctions to encourage compliance.160 Furthermore, even if the ILO Conven-
tion did contain penalties, the ILO still may choose not to enforce them in or-
der to retain support in the international community.161 The ILO Convention 
most likely will not be the main force of reform for this complex social prob-
lem.162 
Governments of importing countries also encounter difficulties when ad-
dressing work environments in exporting countries.163 Governments in devel-
oped countries, like the United States, face sovereignty barriers when attempt-
ing to regulate the behavior of firms that only do business in other countries.164 
Additionally, importing countries often have difficulty fostering the political 
force necessary to compel firms operating within their jurisdictions to change 
their suppliers’ behavior in exporting countries.165 Citizens of importing coun-
tries also confront challenges when using traditional avenues to address 
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qualms about firms’ practices in other countries.166 Concerned consumers must 
first compel their own government to act, which in turn must then influence 
the government of the exporting country, which then must find the correct 
strategy to change the behavior of companies operating in the exporting coun-
try.167 Additionally, exporting governments may be hesitant to change or en-
force existing labor laws, due to the risk that foreign firms may entirely re-
move capital from that country and invest in a jurisdiction with more relaxed 
labor laws and cheaper labor.168 
Multinational corporations, on the other hand, are often in advantageous 
positions to control their own supply chains.169 Manufacturers already have 
monitoring systems in place for their supply chains in order to ensure econom-
ic efficiency.170 These systems are better equipped to prevent human abuses 
from occurring because firms can take precautionary measures while govern-
ments and consumers cannot take action until after abuses have occurred.171 
Additionally, the private sector has access to monetary resources that often 
dwarf the resources available to governments and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs).172 Scholars observe that manufacturing regulation in exporting 
countries has largely shifted from public governance to private contracting 
through large, multinational firms.173 Multinational firms impose certain stand-
ards due to pressure from consumers, investors, and other stakeholders, the 
motivation to evade any potential litigation, and the desire to preempt any fu-
ture government regulation.174 
The importance of this private regulation is also reflected in NGOs’ be-
havior.175 Rather than concentrating efforts on national and international gov-
ernmental bodies, NGOs often apply pressure to private companies in order to 
encourage this type of private regulation.176 For example, the “Raise the Bar, 
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Hershey!” campaign is a joint effort by multiple organizations, including 
Green America, International Labor Rights Forum, and the Global Exchange, 
to educate consumers on Hershey’s stalled efforts to reduce child labor in its 
supply chain.177 The Raise the Bar campaign highlights how NGOs pressure 
companies to become more socially responsible.178 Hershey agreed to work 
with the Rainforest Alliance179 to certify its line of Bliss chocolates and invest 
$10 million in West Africa to reduce child labor by the end of 2012 after the 
International Labor Rights Forum scheduled a Super Bowl ad casting light on 
Hershey’s use of child labor.180 
Therefore, corporations have an incentive to clean up their supply chains 
in order to avoid bad publicity and to promote positive brand recognition.181 
Importing countries, such as the United States, should concentrate resources on 
facilitating this process for multinational companies because these firms are 
usually in the best position to promote change along their supply chains.182 
A. Multinational Corporations Should Certify Their Products and 
Implement Sponsorship Programs in Order to Sustain an  
Ethical Company Image and Reform Supply Chains 
It is often in multinational corporations’ best interest to proactively com-
bat child labor in order to prevent damaging publicity.183 Media exposure of 
sweatshop conditions in New Delhi and Indonesia, for example, soiled The 
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Gap, Inc. and Nike, Inc.’s socially responsible images.184 It is also important, 
however, for corporations to avoid acting rashly and to keep the complex is-
sues that induce child labor in mind when deciding how to solve problems 
along the supply chain.185 Child labor stems from both workers’ decisions, 
conditioned by poverty, and employers’ hiring decisions, conditioned by the 
demands of a globalized economy.186 To pull operations from a country or to 
immediately fire all underage employees could be devastating for children be-
cause they may need to resort to even more dangerous occupations.187 As the 
UNCRC noted, those seeking to eliminate child labor must balance a child’s 
right to be free from exploitation and his or her right to survival.188 
Another issue facing Hershey and other chocolate manufacturers is the 
difficulty tracing the supply chain for chocolate products.189 A large ensemble 
contributes to finalized chocolate bars, including farmers, manufacturers, ex-
porters, and traders.190 Furthermore, manufacturers combine cocoa beans from 
various parts of West Africa together before exporting them—further compli-
cating companies’ ability to distinguish cocoa beans harvested by children’s 
hands from cocoa beans harvested by adults working in humane working con-
ditions.191 After the shareholders filed the complaint against Hershey, the com-
pany highlighted this problem, arguing that the “overwhelmingly vast majority 
of the cocoa materials purchased by Hershey . . . are processed cocoa products 
. . . purchased from large multi-national companies.”192 In order to guarantee 
that cocoa products are child labor free, chocolate manufacturers need a sys-
tem that guarantees that no children were used in each intermediary step of the 
process.193 
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1. Fair Trade Certification 
Fair trade certification addresses both the poverty that creates conditions 
for child labor and the complicated supply chain for chocolate products.194 The 
Payson Center for International Development at Tulane University issued a 
report in 2011 suggesting that product certified cocoa would be one of the 
most effective ways to eliminate child labor in cocoa production.195 Fair trade 
allows farmers in developing countries to “receive special trading conditions 
and increased profits in exchange for meeting various human rights and labor 
standards.”196 Fair trade organizations carry out random supply chain inspec-
tions and provide fair trade-certified labels, which assure consumers that the 
creation of the labeled product satisfied rigorous economic, social, and envi-
ronmental standards.197 
Fair trade certification addresses poverty, the root cause of child labor, by 
factoring the costs that accompany production into farmers’ salaries, rather 
than just global market prices.198 Cocoa farmers often “sell their harvests to 
middlemen who rig scales or misrepresent prices,” a practice that drives down 
farmers’ profits and increases the appeal of child labor.199 Fair trade, on the 
other hand, provides stable payment terms that guarantee not only a living 
wage, but also the capital needed to fuel lasting economic development.200 Fair 
trade certification thus alters the economic incentives for labor practices.201 
Rather than attempting to use children as a source of cheap labor, farmers have 
an incentive to provide work for adults because they are guaranteed a certain 
price and given access to previously out of reach markets for doing so.202 
Fair trade can also be an effective way to reduce child labor because it in-
volves a constant monitoring system to ensure compliance.203 Currently, Her-
shey’s supplier audits are scheduled beforehand, which increases the risk that 
any labor violations will be masked before the inspection.204 With fair trade, 
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producers self-assess their progress against fair trade standards, are evaluated 
by fellow free trade partners, and host random third party inspections to ensure 
that fair trade criteria are being followed.205 
This monitoring is coupled with real sanctions for violating free trade 
standards, such as loss of access to fair trade markets and price premiums.206 
This regulatory system creates compelling profit-motivated incentives for pro-
ducers to reduce, rather than increase, child labor.207 Furthermore, constant 
monitoring and enforcement of labor standards could also reduce child labor 
because gender equality in employment can ensure that women receive the 
same wages as men, and thus reduce the need for children to work as well.208 
Independent monitoring systems also ensure that the complex supply 
chain for chocolate products remains child labor free.209 Careful auditing pro-
vides accountability along the cocoa supply chain despite the many intermedi-
ate buyers involved.210 Unlike uncertified products, fair trade cocoa can always 
be charted back to the source, and labor violations are met with real repercus-
sions.211 
2. Sponsorship Programs 
Converting to fair trade certification, however, does not solve the problem 
of children already working on farms that supply Hershey with cocoa beans.212 
Child labor violations are difficult to resolve because the alternative occupa-
tions for child workers could be even more dangerous.213 “The more that cor-
porations look at their supply chains the more likely it is that they’ll find inap-
propriate practices that can’t easily be resolved,” wrote a CSR blogger for 
Forbes magazine.214 “What would you do if you found 12-year-olds working 
in your factory and you also learned that their families depended on their chil-
dren’s wages to buy food?”215 
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A multinational corporation could implement a sponsorship program for 
children already ingrained in a company’s supply chain.216 The Gap, Inc., for 
example, now provides children previously employed by The Gap, Inc.’s con-
tractors, with access to education, a continued wage, and guaranteed employ-
ment back at the factory after becoming old enough to work legally.217 Similar-
ly, Levi Strauss & Company discovered that contractors used child labor in 
two Bangladeshi factories.218 Levi decided not to terminate the contractual ar-
rangement due to the detrimental effects on the children’s families and the high 
possibility that the children would turn to begging and prostitution once they 
lost their jobs.219 Levi managers and consultants met with the contractors to 
develop an innovative plan: the factories would continue to pay salary and 
benefits to already employed children while they attended school and then “of-
fer them full-time jobs once they reached the legal working age.”220 Addition-
ally, Levi agreed to pay for the students’ tuition and books and would rent 
space and hire a teacher if nearby public schools did not have any room for 
new students.221 
Sponsorship programs address the root cause of child labor—poverty—by 
holding financial safety nets in place for children and their families.222 A spon-
sorship program allows families to continue receiving much-needed income 
while keeping children in school and away from harmful employment.223 Chil-
dren’s education also increases their marketable skills, thus insulating them-
selves and their families from future economic vulnerabilities.224 Firms are 
often reluctant to invest capital in markets without skilled labor, and parents 
are often hesitant to send their children to school if there are no opportunities 
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that stem from education.225 Sponsorship programs can make these communi-
ties more lucrative by increasing school attendance, skilled labor, and incen-
tives for other firms to invest more capital in the community.226 Finally, charity 
initiatives, like a sponsorship program, generate positive publicity for a com-
pany, while also addressing the company’s specific problems along its supply 
chain.227 
B. U.S. Legislators Should Concentrate on Ways to Encourage Companies 
to Address Human Rights Violations Within Their Supply Chains 
In 1992, Senator Harkin introduced the Child Labor Deterrence Act.228 
This legislation would have made it illegal to import products made by chil-
dren.229 Unlike the ILO Convention, this act would have imposed civil and 
criminal penalties on companies that violated it.230 Congress followed a similar 
policy when it amended the Tariff Act to prohibit the import of goods produced 
by indentured child labor in 2000.231 Policy makers justify these bans on im-
ports by both the detrimental impact of child labor on children in exporting 
countries and the potential unfairness to adult workers in developed countries 
who are forced to compete with cheap imports created by children.232 Regula-
tors have rarely enforced this provision of the Tariff Act, however, as the cur-
rent import of chocolate into the United States demonstrates.233 Furthermore, 
these bans on imports fail to address the fundamental cause of child labor—
poverty.234 
Given the fragile circumstances surrounding child labor, Congress should 
not continue to pursue policies like the Child Labor Deterrence Act because it 
could potentially make conditions worse for children.235 Prohibiting goods 
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produced by children reduces the price by artificially decreasing the de-
mand.236 This in turn lowers wages for children who continue to work or forces 
children to find less suitable, and potentially more dangerous, employment.237 
For example, when Senator Harkin introduced the Child Labor Deterrence Act, 
Bangladeshi manufacturers fired 55,000 children in an effort to keep American 
business.238 40,000 of these children disappeared, while others were forced 
into brick carrying and prostitution.239 
Therefore, when governments consider how to curb the use of child labor 
in imports, they also need to consider the child’s right to survive.240 Policies 
that reduce income for working children’s families, by artificially decreasing 
demand in the market, will most likely increase the time children spend work-
ing to make up for the lost income.241 
1. Due Diligence 
Legislators should concentrate on increasing CSR due diligence and 
transparency.242 The quick progression of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CTSCA, 
and H.R. 2759 Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act demon-
strates that policymakers are becoming increasingly open to the idea of using 
disclosure for public policy objectives.243 Public disclosure applies pressure to 
multinational firms to understand what occurs in their supply chains and to 
implement policies that remedy discovered abuses.244 It also encourages more 
supply audits and training about labor issues at the “farm or factory level” of 
the supply chain.245 
Although due diligence for a multinational firm’s supply chain is a new 
concept, evidence already demonstrates that the policy can induce positive 
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change.246 On October 21, 2011, the U.N. Security Council Committee on the 
DRC sent a letter to Mary Schapiro, the SEC Chairman, on the effects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the DRC.247 The letter stated that requiring companies to 
perform due diligence on their supply chain contacts in the DRC was effec-
tive.248 Production of minerals shifted to largely non-conflict areas of the coun-
try in order to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act, reducing the overall profit 
armed groups could garner from penetrating mineral supply chains.249 
“[P]rivate sector purchasing power and due diligence implementation is reduc-
ing conflict financing,” the letter read, “promoting good governance in the 
DRC mining sector, and preserving access to international markets for impov-
erished artisanal miners.”250 
Of course, conducting proper due diligence and subsequently implement-
ing the necessary changes will require a large commitment of time, resources, 
and finances.251 Firms will need to examine all steps of workers’ employment 
across the whole supply chain and then both prevent human rights infractions 
and take corrective action when such infractions do occur.252 Due to the ex-
pense of conducting due diligence and acting on its findings, policymakers 
should strive to make human rights due diligence obligations the same for all 
companies.253 Companies such as Wal-Mart have expressed willingness to 
compete on a more socially conscious playing field once all firms can compete 
on the same basis.254 
Therefore, policymakers should seriously consider passing the H.R. 2759 
Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act.255 Although some crit-
ics are reluctant to put constraints on U.S. companies while they compete on 
an international stage, passing H.R. 2759 could actually guarantee a more even 
playing field for U.S. companies.256 If this bill became law, a uniform federal 
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requirement could ensure that companies not subject to the CTSCA do not en-
joy a “competitive advantage” from using cheap, illicit labor sources.257 Fur-
thermore, a federal standard would also send a message to companies incorpo-
rated abroad that the United States, a market of 310 million consumers, takes 
human rights violations in the work force seriously.258 
2. Provide Incentives for Multinational Firms to Become Fair Trade 
Certified 
Due to the costs involved with supply chain reforms, the United States 
should also follow the European Union’s example and provide financial incen-
tives for multinational companies to become more socially responsible.259 The 
European Union’s investment in fair trade seems to have encouraged greater 
receptivity to fair trade activity in Europe than in the United States.260 In 2007, 
Europe had “254 fair trade importing organizations . . . 3,191 specialty fair 
trade stores . . . and 67,619 supermarkets that carried fair trade products.”261 
Alternatively, the United States had barely “200 fair trade importing organiza-
tions . . . 280 fair trade stores . . . and 40,000 supermarkets that carry fair trade 
products.”262 In 2011, the United States’ per capita consumption of fair trade 
products was less than a fifth of per capita fair trade consumption in the United 
Kingdom.263 When the Fair Labor Organization recorded fair trade consump-
tion by country in the northern hemisphere, the United States only fared better 
in terms of per capita consumption than the Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, 
and Italy.264 
The European Union’s policy on fair trade also seems to have made an 
impression on the chocolate industry.265 Barry Callebaut, a Belgian chocolate 
company based in Switzerland, launched four fair trade certified cocoa recipes 
in January 2011.266 Nestle UK, a British subsidiary of a Swiss company, 
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achieved Fairtrade certification for its four-finger Kit Kat bars in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland in January 2010, and committed to certifying its two-
finger Kit Kat bars in these countries in January 2013.267 Cadbury Company, a 
British company, certified Cadbury Dairy Milk Bar in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in 2009 and certified Cadbury Dairy Milk Fairtrade in Canada, Austral-
ia and New Zealand a year later.268 Although Cadbury currently sells certified 
chocolates in seven countries, Cadbury chocolate products in the United States 
are not certified because Hershey bought Cadbury’s U.S. chocolate business in 
1988.269 So far, Hershey has refused to meet the social standards set by Cad-
bury’s overseas operations.270 
Of course, some U.S. companies have also taken the initiative to become 
fair trade certified without any incentives from the U.S. government.271 Ben & 
Jerry’s, an American ice cream company, announced a new flavor, “Late Night 
Snack,” in 2011, which included fair trade-certified cocoa.272 The company 
also transitioned all ingredients to fair trade in 2013.273 Additionally, Mars, 
Inc.’s Dove Dark chocolates are Rainforest Alliance Certified in the United 
States.274 Even so, the current climate in America’s chocolate sector lags be-
hind other countries in terms of fair trade certification and social awareness.275 
In order to encourage American companies to use fair trade certification, 
and thus reduce child labor, the U.S. government should make fair trade more 
                                                                                                                           
Mar. 14, 2014); Callebaut’s Finest Belgian Chocolate—the Four Classic Recipes Now also Fairtrade 
Certified, BARRY-CALLEBAUT (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.barry-callebaut.com/news?release=6292 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 267 STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR, supra note 20, at 44; Nestle UK and Ireland Doubles Its 
Commitment to Fairtrade, NESTLE (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.nestle.co.uk/media/pressreleases/
kitkat2fingergoesfairtrade#.USUkz82hrlc (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Nestle UK & Ireland Sister 
Companies, NESTLE, http://www.nestle.co.uk/aboutus/nestléuksistercompanies (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014). 
 268 STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR, supra note 20, at 44; The Story, CADBURY, http://www.
cadbury.co.uk/the-story (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 269 Tell Cadbury and Hershey to Offer Free Trade Chocolates for Easter in the US, GLOBAL 
EXCHANGE, http://org.salsalabs.com/o/703/p/dia/action/public/index.sjs?action_KEY=10039 (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 270 Id. 
 271 See STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR, supra note 20, at 43; Our Green Frog Seal on TV—Mars 
Galaxy Chocolate (UK), RAINFOREST ALLIANCE; http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/multimedia/
mars-galaxy-chocolate (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (mentioning that Dove chocolates are certified in 
the United States). 
 272 See STILL TIME TO RAISE THE BAR, supra note 20, at 43; Our History, BEN & JERRY’S, 
http://www.benjerry.com/company/history (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 273 Ben & Jerry’s Commits to Fairtrade Program for 2013, QSR (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.
qsrweb.com/article/206815/Ben-Jerry-s-commits-to-fairtrade-program-for-2013 (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014). 
 274 Our Green Frog Seal on TV—Mars Galaxy Chocolate (UK), supra note 271. 
 275 See supra text accompanying notes 265–274. 
418 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:389 
enticing through tax breaks, subsidies, and consumer education.276 Fair trade 
chocolate is usually more expensive than non-certified chocolate.277 Even so, 
Harvard College, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the London 
School of Economics released a study in 2011 indicating that fair trade labels 
actually increase sales, suggesting that consumers are willing to pay more for 
products free from illicit labor practices.278 After being educated on the prod-
ucts they commonly purchased, consumers in a Belgian study showed willing-
ness to pay up to 10 percent, and sometimes as high as 27 percent, more than 
the normal price in order to support products made without child labor.279 
Therefore, governments can encourage companies to go fair trade by ensuring 
that consumers are aware of the benefits of certification through governmental 
promotions and education, which in turn can encourage higher sales.280 
CONCLUSION 
Child labor is a deep-seated and complicated issue. The efforts of multi-
ple parties, including exporting and importing governments, multinational cor-
porations, NGOs, and consumers, are needed to ensure that all children are free 
from debilitating labor and enjoy safe and stimulating childhoods. If compa-
nies like Hershey and legislators in the United States are serious about contrib-
uting to a solution, all parties need to recognize the forces that make child la-
bor prevalent—especially poverty. Any new policies need to encourage in-
vestment in these exporting communities, rather than removing business or 
jobs, since this could be even more detrimental for children. Fair trade certifi-
cation, sponsorship programs, mandatory due diligence, and public disclosure 
could begin to ensure that when American children receive Hershey kisses on 
Halloween, no children from Ghana or the Ivory Coast were exploited in its 
production. 
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